With order of 15 June 2026, no. 20030, the First Civil Section of the Italian Supreme Court has revisited one of the most delicate and most heavily litigated issues in family disputes: the requirements for the recognition of the divorce maintenance allowance in its equitable-compensatory function. The ruling has caused some alarm among colleagues who assist the economically weaker party — often the wife — because, on a superficial reading, it seems to narrow the scope of the right to the allowance. In reality, read carefully, the judgment takes nothing away from those who frame their claim correctly: it only penalises those who base it on evidentiary foundations that are too generic.
The case decided by the Italian Supreme Court
The case concerned a wife to whom the Court of Appeal had granted the divorce allowance essentially on the basis of a single fact: her lack of employment during the marriage. From that single circumstance the trial judges had presumed that the wife had contributed, through her housework, to her husband's career and wealth — holding that her non-employment "gave rise to the presumption, in the light of what ordinarily happens," of a "substantial contribution to the husband's career and therefore to the formation of his wealth."
What order no. 20030/2026 says verbatim
The Italian Supreme Court quashed the decision, recalling a principle which, on closer inspection, is not new but is here applied with particular rigour. The text of the order states that:
"the divorce allowance, having also an equitable-compensatory function, presupposes a strict finding of fact — also by way of presumptions — that the imbalance between the parties' income and asset positions, existing at the time of divorce, is the effect of the sacrifice made by the weaker spouse in favour of the needs of the family."
As to the mere lack of employment on the part of the claimant, the Court is clear-cut in defining it as a circumstance:
"in itself neutral, and therefore lacking the seriousness and precision required under art. 2729 c.c."
to ground the presumption of a contribution to the formation of the wealth of the stronger spouse. And again, on the attempt to infer the right to the allowance from the income gap alone, the Italian Supreme Court holds that such reasoning amounts to:
"a mere conjecture that cannot be elevated to the rank of a serious and precise piece of circumstantial evidence, apt to ground a valid presumptive argument."
On the procedural level, the Court also recalls the settled principle under which it is possible to challenge before the Court of Cassation, ex art. 360, paragraph 1, no. 3, c.p.c., the violation of art. 2729 c.c., which occurs:
"when the trial judge bases the presumption on a historical fact lacking the seriousness, precision or concordance required for the inference from the known fact of the unknown consequence."
Why this is not a closed door
It is important that colleagues working in family law do not read this ruling as a retreat in the protection of the economically weaker party. The Italian Supreme Court is not saying that the equitable-compensatory allowance has become more difficult to obtain in absolute terms: it says that it cannot be obtained by default, on the basis of an automatic presumption that "she does not work, therefore she contributed." It simply requires that the claim be built on true, specific and demonstrable facts.
And this is precisely the point on which, as a Firm, we have long focused when drafting pleadings on the divorce maintenance allowance: it is not enough to allege the income disparity between the parties — one must recount, and prove, how that imbalance came about.
In our experience, a claim for a divorce allowance with an equitable-compensatory function holds up when supported by elements such as:
- concrete and datable professional sacrifices: the closure of a self-employed activity, a job left behind, an interrupted entrepreneurial project, with reference to specific circumstances and timing rather than generic formulas;
- requests to re-enter the labour market that went unanswered, especially when addressed precisely to the other spouse or to their companies, with the relevant documentary or testimonial evidence;
- the exclusive or predominant care of the children, documented by reference to specific facts (who takes them to school, who follows their extracurricular activities, who manages daily needs) and not stated in abstract terms;
- a causal link, and not a mere temporal coincidence, between the weaker spouse's sacrifice and the other's enrichment or professional growth: shareholdings that remained purely formal, obstacles to accessing accounting documentation, missed hirings despite legitimate expectations, profits systematically not distributed;
- objective personal conditions — age, state of health, pension situation — that make the gap in labour-market re-entry prospects concrete and not merely theoretical.
A case we are currently handling, which for obvious reasons of confidentiality we cannot describe in detail, illustrates this approach well: a claimant who closed her own commercial activity to devote herself to the children, who repeatedly — and in vain — asked to be hired by her ex-spouse's companies, and who for years held a shareholding that remained on paper only, without ever actually accessing the accounting documentation or the related economic benefits. It is precisely these facts, individually alleged and proved with testimony and documents, and not the mere circumstance of a discontinuous working career, that provide — even in the light of Italian Supreme Court no. 20030/2026 — the basis for a solid claim for an allowance, one that is difficult to attack on appeal.
The message we wish to leave with the people who turn to our Firm at what is already a difficult moment is that this judgment must not discourage those who have truly sacrificed their professional lives for the family. If anything, it should push us towards a more careful drafting and evidence-gathering exercise: precise heads of proof, carefully identified witnesses, complete income and asset documentation — so as to turn what would otherwise remain a generic "I have never worked" into a clear, verifiable and — above all — persuasive factual narrative for the judge.
Frequently asked questions on the divorce allowance after Cass. no. 20030/2026
Does lack of employment alone entitle a person to the divorce allowance?
No. According to Cass. no. 20030/2026, lack of employment, on its own, is a "neutral" circumstance and is not sufficient to ground the presumption of a contribution to the formation of the other spouse's wealth.
What must a person claiming the divorce allowance with an equitable-compensatory function prove?
They must allege and prove concrete facts: datable professional sacrifices, requests to re-enter the labour market that went unanswered, predominant care of the children, and a causal link — not a mere coincidence — with the ex-spouse's enrichment or professional growth.
Is the income gap between the two spouses sufficient to obtain the allowance?
No. The Italian Supreme Court makes it clear that the criterion is not the income disparity in itself, but the finding that such disparity is the effect of the sacrifice borne by the economically weaker spouse.
For personalised advice on separation, divorce and the maintenance allowance, Cervesato & Associati is at your disposal.
Appendix — Full text of the key passages of the order
Italian Supreme Court, First Civil Section, Order of 15 June 2026, no. 20030
(Hearing date 21 April 2026 — Filed with the Registry on 15 June 2026)
WHEREAS
The first three grounds of appeal, which may be examined jointly since they are interrelated, are well founded.
The appellant challenges the judgment under review for having granted the ex-wife the divorce allowance in its maintenance-equitable functions, on the ground that she had allegedly proved the income-and-asset gap with her ex-spouse and her contribution to the formation of his wealth, on the basis of the presumption that her failure to carry out any working activity for the duration of the relationship (14 years) was to be attributed to a tacit agreement between the spouses themselves.
The question submitted for the assessment of this Court presupposes a review of the settled case-law of the Supreme Court on the matter.
It must be observed that the equitable-compensatory function of the divorce allowance presupposes that the economically weaker spouse has sacrificed working opportunities or opportunities for professional growth in order to devote themselves to the family, the subjective motives that led to that choice being immaterial — a choice which, in any event, was accepted and shared by the other spouse — since the divorce allowance, in the aspect under consideration, aims to compensate the economic imbalance resulting from the deployment of one's own energies and aptitudes within the family, rather than in working activities or in income-generating opportunities for professional growth, regardless of whether that choice was based on affective reasons or on mere economic-relational opportunity (Cass., no. 27945/2023).
The divorce allowance, having also an equitable-compensatory function, presupposes a strict finding of fact — also by way of presumptions — that the imbalance between the parties' income and asset positions, existing at the time of divorce, is the effect of the sacrifice made by the weaker spouse in favour of the needs of the family, whereas, in the absence of proof of such causal link, the allowance may be justified only on strictly maintenance-related grounds, discernible where the weaker spouse does not have sufficient means for a dignified existence or cannot procure them for objective reasons (Cass., no. 26520/2024; no. 35434/2023).
On the same topic, it has also been observed that, in the event of dissolution of marriage, the divorce allowance — having a compensatory-equitable function — must be adjusted to the contribution made by the claimant spouse who, even in the absence of proof of the renunciation of realistic professional-income opportunities, demonstrates having contributed significantly to family life by taking on the exclusive or predominant care and assistance of the family and children, also by making available, in any form, their own economic resources — such as the granting of guarantees — or their own personal and social resources, in order to satisfy the family's needs and support the formation of the family and personal wealth of the other spouse, with the result that any strictly maintenance-related aspect is absorbed (Cass., no. 24795/2024).
In the case at hand, it has not been proved that the ex-wife, as the economically weaker spouse, sacrificed working opportunities or opportunities for professional growth in order to devote herself to the family.
Indeed, the Court of Appeal held it to be presumed that Vi.Vi. had devoted herself to the family by choice shared with her husband, thereby contributing to her husband's career, or at least assuming the family burdens.
However, that presumption was based exclusively on the fact that the ex-wife did not carry out working activities, and not on the allegation of concrete facts relating, first and foremost, to the associated contribution to the formation of the husband's and the family's wealth and to any renunciation of professional opportunities.
In this regard, according to a principle settled in the case-law of this Court, it is possible to challenge before the Court of Cassation, under art. 360, paragraph 1, no. 3, c.p.c., the violation or misapplication of art. 2729 c.c., which arises when the trial judge bases the presumption on a historical fact lacking the seriousness, precision or concordance required for the inference from the known fact of the unknown consequence (Cass., no. 25889/2025; no. 9054/2022).
In the case at hand, the territorial Court drew, from the sole circumstance — in itself neutral, and therefore lacking the seriousness and precision required under art. 2729 c.c. — of the ex-wife's failure to carry out working activities, the conviction that the latter had in concrete terms renounced working opportunities or opportunities for professional growth.
In this connection, the Court of Appeal's finding that the income gap was of such magnitude that Vi.Vi. could not overcome it — since, despite her young age and demonstrated working capacity, she could not find employment comparable in remuneration and stability to that of her ex-spouse — is likewise open to challenge, amounting to mere conjecture which cannot be elevated to the rank of a serious and precise piece of circumstantial evidence, apt to ground a valid presumptive argument.
For the foregoing reasons, upholding the first three grounds, the judgment under review must be quashed — the fourth ground being absorbed — with remittal of the case to the Court of Appeal for a fresh examination of the case in accordance with the principles of law set out above — including as to the costs of the proceedings — regarding the prerequisites for the divorce allowance in its equitable-compensatory function.
P.Q.M. (for these reasons)
The Court upholds the first three grounds of appeal, the fourth being absorbed, quashes the judgment under review within the limits set out in the reasoning, and remits the case to the Court of Appeal of Rome, in a different composition, including as to the costs of the proceedings before the Court of Cassation.
Thus decided in the chamber of council of the First Civil Section, on 21 April 2026. Filed with the Registry on 15 June 2026.